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The experience of banking crises in the 1930s was severe. Before this, as-
suring ﬁnancial stability was primarily the responsibility of central banks.
The Bank of England had led the way. The last true panic in England was
associated with the collapse of the Overend, Gurney, and Company in
1866. After that the Bank avoided crises by skillful manipulation of the dis-
count rate and supply of liquidity to the market. Many other central banks
followed suit, and by the end of the nineteenth century crises in Europe
were rare. Although the Federal Reserve System was founded in 1914, its de-
centralized structure meant that it was not able to eﬀectively prevent bank-
ing crises. The eﬀect of the banking crises in the 1930s was so detrimental
that in addition to reforming the Federal Reserve System the United 
States also imposed many types of banking regulation to prevent systemic
risk. These included capital adequacy standards, asset restrictions, liquid-
ity requirements, reserve requirements, interest rate ceilings on deposits,
and restrictions on services and product lines. Over the years many of these
regulations have been removed. However, capital adequacy requirements
in the form of the Basel agreements remain.
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out an error in an earlier version.If properly designed and implemented, capital regulations may reduce
systemic risk. However, the growing importance of credit risk transfer has
raised concerns about whether regulation as currently implemented does
increase ﬁnancial stability. The evidence reviewed subsequently suggests
that there is a transfer of risk from the banks to insurance companies. One
view is that this credit risk transfer is desirable because it allows diversi-
ﬁcation between diﬀerent sectors of the ﬁnancial system that cannot be
achieved in other ways. On the other hand, if the transfer arises because of
ill-designed regulations it may be undesirable. For example, regulatory ar-
bitrage between the banking and insurance sectors could conceivably lead
to an increase in risk in the insurance sector, which increases overall sys-
temic risk. As Hellwig (1994, 1995, 1998) has repeatedly argued, attempts
to shift risks can lead to a situation where these risks come back in the form
of counterparty credit risk.
The purpose of this paper is to consider both arguments. We show ﬁrst
that diversiﬁcation across sectors can lead to an optimal allocation of re-
sources, and second that poorly designed and implemented capital regula-
tion can lead to an increase in systemic risk.
Our analysis builds on our previous work on ﬁnancial crises (see, e.g.,
Allen and Gale 1998, 2000a–c, 2003, 2004a–b, and Gale 2003, 2004). In
Allen and Gale (2004b) we argued that ﬁnancial regulation should be
based on a careful analysis of the market failure that justiﬁes government
intervention. We developed a model of intermediaries and ﬁnancial mar-
kets in which intermediaries could trade risk. It was shown that, provided
ﬁnancial markets and ﬁnancial contracts are complete, the allocation is
incentive eﬃcient. When contracts are incomplete—for example, if the
banks use deposit contracts with ﬁxed promised payments—then the allo-
cation is constrained eﬃcient. In other words, there is no justiﬁcation for
regulation by the government. In order for regulation to be justiﬁed mar-
kets must be incomplete. As in standard theories of government regulation,
it is ﬁrst necessary to identify a market failure to analyze intervention. In
Allen and Gale (2003) we suggested that the standard justiﬁcation for cap-
ital regulation, namely that it controls moral hazard arising from deposit
insurance, is not a good motivation. The two policies must be jointly justi-
ﬁed and the literature does not do this.
There is a small but growing literature on credit risk transfer. The ﬁrst
part considers the impact of credit risk transfer on the allocation of re-
sources when there is asymmetric information. Morrison (2005) shows that
a market for credit derivatives can destroy the signalling role of bank debt
and lead to an overall reduction in welfare as a result. He suggests that dis-
closure requirements for credit derivatives can help oﬀset this eﬀect. Nicolo
and Pelizzon (2004) show that if there are banks with diﬀerent abilities to
screen borrowers, then good banks can signal their type using ﬁrst-to-
default basket contracts, which are often used in practice. These involve a
payment to the protection buyer, if any, of a basket of assets defaults. Only
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such contracts. Chiesa (2004) considers a situation wherein banks have a
comparative advantage in evaluating and monitoring risks but limited risk-
bearing capacity. Credit risk transfer improves eﬃciency by allowing the
monitored debt of large ﬁrms to be transferred to the market while banks
can use their limited risk-bearing capacity for loans to small businesses. In
contrast to these papers, our paper focuses on the situation where there is
symmetric information, and shows how credit risk transfer can improve the
allocation of resources through better risk sharing.
The second part of the literature focuses on the stability aspects of credit
risk transfer. Wagner and Marsh (2004) consider the transfer of risk be-
tween banking and nonbanking sectors. They ﬁnd that the transfer of risk
out of a relatively fragile banking sector leads to an improvement in stabil-
ity. Wagner (2005b) develops a model where credit risk transfer improves
the liquidity of bank assets. However, this can increase the probability of
crises by increasing the risks that banks are prepared to take. Wagner
(2005a) shows that the increased portfolio diversiﬁcation possibilities in-
troduced by credit risk transfer can increase the probability of liquidity-
based crises. The reason is that the increased diversiﬁcation leads banks to
reduce the amount of liquid assets they hold and increase the amount of
risky assets. In contrast to these contributions, in our paper the focus is on
the role of poorly designed regulation and its interaction with credit risk
transfer in increasing systemic risk.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We start in section 7.2 by con-
sidering the institutional background of credit risk transfer. We consider
the evidence on how important risk transfers are quantitatively and which
entities they occur between. Section 7.3 develops a model with a banking
sector where consumers deposit their funds and ﬁrms borrow and repay
these loans with some probability. There is also an insurance sector. Some
ﬁrms have an asset that may be damaged. They require insurance to allow
this asset to be repaired if it is damaged. The equilibrium with complete
markets and contracts is characterized. In this case, complete markets
allow full risk sharing. Section 7.4 develops an example with incomplete
markets and contracts and shows how ineﬃcient capital regulation can in-
crease systemic risk. Finally, section 7.5 contains concluding remarks.
7.2 Institutional Background on Credit Risk Transfer
Credit risk has been transferred between parties for many years. Bank
guarantees and credit insurance provided by insurance companies, for ex-
ample, have a long history. Securitization of mortgages occurred in the
1970s. Bank loans were syndicated in the 1970s, and secondary markets for
bank loans developed in the 1980s. In recent years a number of other meth-
ods of risk transfer have come to be widely used.
In table 7.1, Bank of International Settlements (BIS 2003) shows the 
Systemic Risk and Regulation 343size of credit risk transfer markets using various instruments from 1995–
2002. Institutions transferring risk out are referred to as “risk shedders”
while institutions taking on risk on are referred to as “risk buyers.” One im-
portant class of instrument is credit derivatives. An example of these is
credit default swaps. These are bilateral contracts where the risk shedder
pays a ﬁxed periodic fee in exchange for a payment contingent on an event
344 Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale
Table 7.1 Size of credit risk transfer markets (in billions of U.S.$)
Instrument 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Loan trading (turnover)
U.S. market 34 40 61 78 79 102 118 117a
(Loan Pricing Corporation)
Credit Derivatives (outstanding)
BIS triennial survey 108 693
US OCCb 144 287 426 395 492c
British Bankers Association 180 350 586 893 1,189 1,952d
Risk magazine 810 1,398
ISDA 919 1,600d
Asset-backed securities
U.S. market (outstanding) 315 403 517 684 816 947 1,114 1,258f
(Bond Market Association)e
European Market (issuance)
(Moody’s)g 68 80 134 50h
Australian market (outstanding) 7 10 15 19 27 33 38 54
(Australian Bureau of Statistics)
Collateralized debt obligations
U.S. market (outstanding) 1 1 19 48 85 125 167 232f
(Bond Market Association)
European market (issuance)
(Moody’s) 42 71 114 70h
Total bank credit (outstanding)j
IMF 23,424 23,576 23,309 26,018 26,904 27,221 27,442 29,435i
Corporate debt securities (outstanding)k
BIS 3,241 3,373 3,444 4,042 4,584 4,939 5,233 5,505i
Source: BIS (2003).
aFirst three quarters of 2002, annualized.
bHoldings of U.S. commercial banks.





hFirst half of 2002.
iJune 2002.
jDomestic and international credit to nonbank borrowers (United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Euro
area). 
kDebt securities issued in international and domestic markets, nonﬁnancial corporates.such as default on a reference asset or assets. The contingent payment is
provided by the risk buyer. With asset-backed securities, loans, bonds, or
other receivables are transferred to a special purpose vehicle (SPV). The
payoﬀs from these assets are then paid out to investors. The credit risk of
the instruments in the SPV is borne by the investors. The underlying pool
of assets in asset-backed securities is relatively homogeneous. Collateral-
ized debt obligations also use an SPV but have more heterogeneous assets.
Payouts are tranched, with claims on the pools separated into diﬀerent de-
grees of seniority in bankruptcy and timing of default. The equity tranche
is the residual claim and has the highest risk. The mezzanine tranche comes
next in priority. The senior tranche has the highest priority and is often
AAA rated.
It can be seen from table 7.1 that the use of all types of credit risk trans-
fer has increased substantially. The growth has been particularly rapid in
credit derivatives and collateralized debt obligations, however. Despite this
rapid growth, a comparison of the outstanding amounts of credit risk trans-
fer instruments with the total outstanding amounts of bank credit and cor-
porate debt securities shows that they remain small in relative terms.
In table 7.2, British Bankers Association (BBA 2002) shows the buyers
of credit protection in panel A and the sellers in panel B. From panel A it
can be seen that the buyers are primarily banks. Securities houses also play
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Table 7.2 Buyers and sellers of credit protection (percent of market)
End of 1999 End of 2001
A. Buyers of credit protection
Banks 63 52
Securities houses 18 21
Hedge funds 3 12
Corporates 6 4
Insurance companiesa 76
Mutual funds 1 2
Pension funds 1 1
Government/Export credit agencies 1 2
B. Sellers of credit protection
Banks 47 39
Securities houses 16 16
Hedge funds 5 5
Corporates 3 2
Insurance companiesa 23 33
Mutual funds 2 3
Pension funds 3 2
Government/Export credit agencies 1 0
Source: BBA Credit Derivatives Report 2001/2002.
aIncludes monoline companies and reinsurers.an important role. Hedge funds went from being fairly insigniﬁcant in 1999
to being signiﬁcant in 2001. Corporates, insurance companies, and the
other buyers do not constitute an important part of demand in the market.
From panel B, it can be seen that banks are also important sellers of credit
protection. In contrast to their involvement as buyers, the role of insurance
companies as sellers is signiﬁcant. Securities houses also sell signiﬁcant
amounts, while the remaining institutions play a fairly limited role. The
results of a survey contained in Fitch (2003) are consistent with table 7.2.
They found that the global insurance sector had a net seller position after
deducting protection bought of $283 billion. The global banking industry
purchased $97 billion of credit protection. A signiﬁcant amount of risk is
thus being transferred into the insurance industry from banks and other ﬁ-
nancial institutions. However, BIS (2005) reports that credit risk transfer
investments made up only 1 percent of insurers’ total investments, and that
their ﬁnancial strength is not threatened by their involvement in these
types of investment.
As discussed in the introduction, these ﬁgures raise the important issue
of why these transfers of risk are taking place. Is it the result of ﬁnancial in-
stitutions seeking to diversify their risk? Alternatively, is it the result of reg-
ulatory arbitrage, and if so, can this arbitrage lead to a concentration of
risk that increases the probability of systemic collapse?
We turn next to the role of credit risk transfer in allowing diversiﬁcation
between diﬀerent sectors of the economy.
7.3 Diversiﬁcation through Credit Risk Transfer
We use a simple Arrow-Debreu economy to illustrate the welfare prop-
erties of credit risk transfer when markets are complete. First we describe
the primitives of the model, which will be used here and in following sec-
tions. Then we describe an equilibrium with complete markets. We note
that the fundamental theorems of welfare economics imply that risk shar-
ing is eﬃcient and, hence, there is no role for government regulation in this
setting. It is also worth noting that there is no role for capital. More pre-
cisely, the capital structure is irrelevant to the value of the ﬁrm, as claimed
by Modigliani and Miller, and in particular there is no rationale for capital
regulation. (This point has been made repeatedly by Gale 2003, 2004; Al-
len and Gale 2003; and Gale and Özgür 2005).
The model serves two purposes. First, it serves to show how credit risk
transfers can promote eﬃcient risk sharing if we interpret the markets for
contingent securities in the Arrow-Debreu model as derivatives or insur-
ance contracts. Secondly, it provides a benchmark for the discussion of in-
complete markets that follows. By contrast with the Arrow-Debreu model,
there is no reason to think that the equilibrium allocation of risk bearing is
eﬃcient when markets are incomplete. So, incompleteness of markets pro-
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we shall see, a badly designed policy of capital regulation may lead to
greater instability.
7.3.1 The Basic Model
There are three dates t   0, 1, 2 and a single, all-purpose good that can
be used for consumption or investment at each date. There are two securi-
ties, one short and one long. The short security is represented by a storage
technology: one unit at date t produces one unit at date t   1. The long se-
curity is represented by a constant-returns-to-scale investment technology
that takes two periods to mature: one unit invested in the long security at
date 0 produces R   1 units of the good at date 2 (and nothing at date 1).
This simple structure provides a tradeoﬀ between liquidity and the rate of
return (the yield curve). Banks would like to earn the higher return oﬀered
by the long asset, but that may cause problems, because the banks’ liabili-
ties (demand deposits) are liquid.
In addition to these securities, banks and insurance companies have dis-
tinct proﬁtable investment opportunities. Banks can make loans to ﬁrms
that succeed with probability  . More precisely, each ﬁrm borrows one unit
at date 0 and invests in a risky venture that produces BH units of the good
at date 2 if successful and BL if unsuccessful. There is assumed to be an in-
ﬁnite supply of such ﬁrms, so the banks take all the surplus. (In eﬀect, these
“ﬁrms” simply represent a constant-returns-to-scale investment technol-
ogy for the banks.) Because we are only interested in nondiversiﬁable risks,
we assume that the loans made by an individual bank are perfectly corre-
lated: either they all pay oﬀ or none do. This is a gross simpliﬁcation that
does not essentially aﬀect the points we want to make.
The bank’s other customers are depositors, who have one unit of the
good at date 0 and none at dates 1 and 2. Depositors are uncertain of their
preferences: with probability  they are early consumers,who only value the
good at date 1 and with probability 1 –   they are late consumers, who only
value the good at date 2. The utility of consumption is represented by a util-
ity function U(c) with the usual properties. We normalize the number of
consumers to 1. The form of the depositors’ preferences provides a demand
for liquidity and explains why the bank must oﬀer a contract that allows the
option of withdrawing either at date 1 or date 2.
The insurance companies have access to a large number of ﬁrms, whose
measure is normalized to one. Each ﬁrm owns an asset that produces A
units of the good at date 2. With probability   the asset suﬀers some dam-
age at date 1. Unless this damage is repaired, at a cost of C, the asset be-
comes worthless and will produce nothing at date 2. The ﬁrms also have a
unit endowment at date 0 which the insurance company invests in the short
and long securities in order to pay the ﬁrms’ damages at date 1. The risks
to diﬀerent ﬁrms are assumed to be independent, so the fraction of ﬁrms
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tantly, the risks faced by the insurance and banking sectors are not per-
fectly correlated, so there are some gains from sharing risks. This in turn
provides the potential for gains from credit risk transfer.
Finally, we introduce a class of risk-neutral investors who provide capi-
tal to the insurance and banking sectors. Although investors are risk neu-
tral, we assume that their consumption must be nonnegative at each date.
This is a crucial assumption. Without it, the investors could absorb all risk
and provide unlimited liquidity, and the problem of achieving eﬃcient risk
sharing would be trivial. The assumption of nonnegative consumption, on
the other hand, implies that investors can only provide risk-sharing ser-
vices to banks and/or insurance companies if they invest in real assets that
provide future income streams. The investor’s utility function is deﬁned by
u(c0, c1, c2)    c0   c1   c2,
where ct 0 denotes the investor’s consumption at date t 0, 1, 2. The con-
stant   E(R) represents the investor’s opportunity cost of funds. For ex-
ample, the investors may have access to investments that yield a very high
rate of return but are very risky and very illiquid. Markets are segmented,
and other agents do not have access to these assets. Banks cannot include
these assets in their portfolios, so they cannot earn as much on the capital
invested in the bank as the investors could. This gap deﬁnes the economic
cost of capital: in order to compensate the investors for the opportunity
cost of the capital they invest, the depositors must take a smaller payout in
order to subsidize the earnings of the investors.
We can assume without loss of generality that the role of investors is
simply to provide capital to the intermediary through a contract e (e0, e1,
e2) where e0   0 denotes the investor’s supply of capital at date t   0, and
et   0 denotes the investor’s consumption at dates t   1, 2. While it is fea-
sible for the investors to invest in assets at date 0 and trade them at date 1,
it can never be proﬁtable for them to do so in equilibrium. More precisely,
the no-arbitrage conditions ensure that proﬁts from trading assets are zero
or negative at any admissible prices, and the investor’s preferences for con-
sumption at date 0 imply that the investors will never want to invest in as-
sets at date 0 and consume the returns at dates 1 and 2. An investor’s en-
dowment consists of a large (unbounded) amount of the good X0 at date 0
and nothing at dates 1 and 2. This assumption has two important implica-
tions. First, since the investors have an unbounded endowment at date 0
there is free entry into the capital market, and the usual zero-proﬁt condi-
tion implies that investors receive no surplus in equilibrium. Second, the
fact that investors have no endowment (and nonnegative consumption) at
dates 1 and 2 implies that their capital must be converted into assets in or-
der to provide risk sharing at dates 1 and 2. We can then write the investors’
utility in the form:
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The most plausible structure of uncertainty is one that allows for some
diversiﬁcation and some aggregate risk. This is achieved by assuming that
the proportions of damaged ﬁrms for the insurance sector and failing ﬁrms
for the banking sector equal the probabilities  and  , respectively, and that
these probabilities are themselves random. For the purposes of illustration,
suppose that   and   each take on two values,  H and  L and  H and  L.
Nothing would change if we adopted a more general structure, but this is
enough to make the essential points. Note that   and   are not perfectly
correlated. We may observe any combination of values, ( H,  H), ( L,  H),
( H,  L), or ( L,  L). The uncertainty in the model is resolved at the begin-
ning of date 1. Banks’ depositors learn whether they are early or late con-
sumers and banks learn whether the ﬁrms borrowing from them have failed.
Insurance companies learn which ﬁrms’ assets have suﬀered damage.
7.3.2 An Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium
In this section we provide a sketch of the deﬁnition of Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium for the model outlined previously. (A more complete treatment
of equilibrium can be found in Gale 2004.) We stress the market structure
and its role in allowing economic agents to achieve an optimal allocation
of risk and intertemporal consumption.
Contingent Securities
Aggregate uncertainty is determined by the four states of nature
s ∈ S   [( H,  H), ( L,  H), ( H,  L), ( L,  L)].
We denote these four states HH, LH, HL, LL. Contingent securities are
deﬁned by the date of delivery and the state on which delivery is contingent.
The true aggregate state s is unknown at date 0 and is revealed at date 1, so
there are nine contingent securities, a single contingent security which
promises one unit of the good at date 0 and a contingent security that
promises delivery of one unit of the good at date t in state s for every t   1,
2 and s   S. We denote the security delivering the good at date 0 by 0 and
the security delivering the good at date t in state s by (t, s) for t   1, 2 and 
s ∈ S.
The simplest way to represent complete markets is to assume there exists
a separate market at date 0 for each of the previously deﬁned contingent se-
curities. Take security 0 to be the numeraire and let qt(s) denote the price,
in terms of the numeraire, of one unit of security (t, s).
It is important to realize that the Arrow security markets only allow one
to hedge aggregate risks. The idiosyncratic risks presented by the damage
to individual ﬁrms insured by the insurance sector and the failure of indi-
vidual ﬁrms borrowing from the banking sector cannot be hedged using
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spective sectors and the insurance companies and banks, respectively, can
perfectly hedge these risks by pooling, markets for all risks, aggregate and
idiosyncratic, are eﬀectively complete once we take into account the role of
the intermediaries as well as the Arrow securities. An alternative approach
would have been to allow ﬁrms to enter markets for idiosyncratic risk.
These markets would be competitive despite the presence of a single sup-
plier, since the risks are eﬀectively perfect substitutes in a world with per-
fect diversiﬁcation.
No-Arbitrage Conditions
Because markets are complete, economic agents do not need to hold as-
sets for the purpose of hedging risks or smoothing consumption. In fact,
assets are redundant securities in the sense that they can be synthesized by
trading contingent securities. Assets play an important role in equilibrium,
however, because their existence places constraints on equilibrium prices
and they are necessary to clear the goods market by altering the supply of
contingent securities.
The short asset converts one unit of the good at date t into one unit of
the good at date t   1, independently of the state. Since the state is un-
known at date 0, the storage technology converts one unit of the good at
date 0 into one unit of the good at date 1, independently of the state. So in-
vesting one unit of the good in the storage technology at date 0 produces
one unit of each of the contingent securities (1, s) at date 1. If the cost of




q1(s)   1.
At date 1, the state is known, so it is possible to invest one unit in the short
asset in state sand produce one unit of the contingent security (2, s) at date
2. Then the no-arbitrage condition requires
q2(s)   q1(s)
for each state s. To see why this condition must hold, consider the follow-
ing example, which violates the condition:
q1(s)   0.2   0.3   q2(s).
A riskless arbitrage proﬁt can be achieved as follows. At date 0, buy one
unit of the (1, s) contingent security and sell one unit of the (2, s) security
for a proﬁt of 0.3 – 0.2   0.1. At date 1, if state s occurs, the (1, s) contin-
gent security yields one unit of the good. Investing this unit of the good in
the short asset produces one unit of the good at date 2 in state s, which can
be used to redeem the unit of the (2, s) contingent security issued at date 0.
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unknown, so the long asset only gives rise to one no-arbitrage condition.
One unit of the good at date 0 yields R units of the good at date 2, inde-
pendently of the state; in other words, Runits of the contingent security (2,
s) for each state s. Then the no-arbitrage condition that the cost of the in-
puts is greater than or equal to the value of the outputs is
∑
s∈S
q2(s)R   1.
These no-arbitrage conditions can also be thought of as zero-proﬁt con-
ditions. If the proﬁt is negative, no one invests in the asset at that date and
state; if someone does invest, the proﬁt is zero. In either case, investments
in the assets do not aﬀect an economic agent’s wealth (in the case of an in-
dividual) or market value (in the case of a ﬁrm). In the aggregate, some in-
vestment in these assets may be necessary in order to transform goods at
one date into goods at a future date, but it is a matter of indiﬀerence which
economic agent undertakes the investment activity. In particular, this im-
plies a separation property that holds for every agent’s decision problem:
the optimal investment in the short and long asset is independent of the
agent’s optimal choice of other variables, such as consumption or loan and
insurance contracts.
Banking
As in the standard Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, banks provide
liquidity insurance for consumers who are uncertain about the optimal
timing of their consumption. Consumers deposit their endowments of one
unit of the good with the bank at date 0 and are promised future con-
sumption payments conditional on their types, early or late. An early con-
sumer is promised c1(s) of the contingent security (1, s) for each state s; a
late consumer is promised c2(s) units of the contingent security (2, s) for
each state s. Thus, the contracts the banks oﬀer are complete in the sense
that they allow the payments made to vary across the aggregate states s.
Free entry and competition in the banking sector force banks to oﬀer con-
tracts that maximize the expected utility of the typical depositor subject to
the constraint that the bank break even on the deal. If a bank did not max-
imize the expected utility of depositors another bank would enter, oﬀer a
better contract and take away all its customers. The break-even condition
is equivalent to a budget constraint that says that the value of promised
consumption is less than or equal to the value of the deposits. The deposits
are one unit per capita and the per capita demand for consumption is  c1(s)




[q1(s) c1(s)   q2(s)(1    )c2(s)]   1.
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its. The expected utility of the typical depositor can be constructed as fol-
lows. In each state s, the depositor has a probability  of being an early con-
sumer and 1 –  of being a late consumer, so his expected utility conditional
on s is  U[c1(s)]   (1 –  )U[c2(s)]. Then the expected utility at date 0, be-
fore the state is known, is obtained by taking expectations over states
E{ U[c1(s)]   (1    )U[c2(s)]}.
It is important to note that the depositors cannot trade directly in the
markets for contingent securities or assets. As Cone (1983) and Jacklin
(1986) have shown, it is not possible for depositors to obtain liquidity in-
surance from a bank if they can directly trade the securities the banks hold.
In addition to providing consumption smoothing for consumers, the
banks can invest in loans to ﬁrms. Because we assume that entrepreneurs
with projects are in perfectly elastic supply and banks have access to a lim-
ited amount of deposits, equilibrium requires that entrepreneurs earn zero
proﬁts. In other words, all the surplus goes to the banks. Since one unit of
the good at date 0 produces BH when the payoﬀ is high and BL when the
payoﬀis low, the zero-proﬁt condition requires that the face value of a loan
of one unit to the ﬁrm is D   BH. In the high-payoﬀ state the ﬁrm can re-
pay the loan, but in the low payoﬀ-state it defaults and the bank seizes the
remaining value of the ﬁrm BL. Because entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent be-
tween borrowing to fund a project and not undertaking the project at all,
the number of projects undertaken is determined by the supply of loanable
funds from the bank. Although banks are earning a positive return on each
loan, they are indiﬀerent about the number of loans they oﬀer because they
can replicate these loans through the markets for Arrow securities (after
pooling the idiosyncratic risks).
Insurance
Insurance companies provide two services to ﬁrms. Note that these ﬁrms
are diﬀerent from the ﬁrms that borrow from banks. The insurance com-
panies insure the ﬁrm’s assets against damage (if it is eﬃcient to do so) and
they provide consumption smoothing to the owner of the ﬁrm. We make
this assumption for convenience, but it is not necessary. The ﬁrms could
provide the same consumption-smoothing services for themselves by trad-
ing contingent securities. Recall that in order for banks to provide insur-
ance to their depositors it was necessary to exclude the depositors from the
asset markets. By contrast, there is no need to limit the market participa-
tion of the insurance companies’ customers. Since the damage to assets is
observed by the insurance companies, there is no incentive constraint to
worry about. We will allow ﬁrms to participate in markets when we con-
sider the case of incomplete markets in the sequel.
It is eﬃcient to repair the damage to the ﬁrm’s asset if the cost of doing
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q2(s)A. An optimal insurance contract will make the decision to pay the
damages contingent on the state. Contracts are again complete. The insur-
ance company will also promise the ﬁrm owner consumption a2(s) at date
2 in state s. Free entry and competition in the insurance sector imply that
the insurance companies oﬀer ﬁrms a contract that maximizes the utility
of the ﬁrm’s owner subject to a break-even constraint. The break-even con-
straint is equivalent to the following budget constraint:
∑
s∈S
q2(s)a2(s)   1  ∑
s∈S
{ (s)max[q2(s)A   q1(s)C,0]   [1    (s)]q2(s)A}.
The left-hand side is the value of consumption promised to the owner; the
right-hand side is the value of the owner’s endowment at date 0 plus the
value of outputs from the ﬁrm’s assets at date 2 net of damage payments at
date 1. Note that we assume here that the insurance company can perfectly
diversify across ﬁrms, so that exactly a fraction  (s) of its customers suﬀer
damage in state s and 1 –  (s) suﬀer no damage. Since the insurance com-
panies are competitive, their objective is to maximize the ﬁrm owner’s ex-
pected utility
E{U[a2(s)]},
subject to the budget constraint above.
Investors
We can describe the investors’ decision problem in a similar way, al-
though it adds relatively little to our understanding of the model when
markets are complete. Since there are a large number of investors with very
large endowments, their consumption at date 0 is assumed to be positive.
This implies that, unless they make zero proﬁts by trading in markets for
contingent securities, there will be an excess supply of investment. The only
important implication for equilibrium takes the form of a no-arbitrage
condition: any feasible consumption plan that requires the investor to sell
e0 units at date 0 and purchase et(s)   0 units of the contingent security (t,
s) that increases expected utility must also cost a positive amount. For-
mally, if there exists a trade (e0, et[s]) such that
E[e1(s)   e2(s)]    e0,
then it must be the case that
∑
s∈S
[q1(s)e1(s)   q2(s)e2(s)]   e0.
Conversely, if (e0, et[s]) is a trade that occurs in equilibrium, then it must be
the case that it leaves expected utility unchanged
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and it leaves the budget constraint unchanged.
∑
s∈S
[q1(s)e1(s)   q2(s)e2(s)]   e0
Otherwise, the trade would violate the no-arbitrage condition. Again, the
no-arbitrage condition constrains equilibrium prices but does not other-
wise aﬀect equilibrium.
Investors may share some of the risks born by consumers and ﬁrms, but
they do so indirectly through the markets for contingent securities rather
than through explicit risk-sharing contracts with individual consumers
and ﬁrms. They perform this function by supplying e0 at date 0, which can
be invested in short or long assets or can be used to ﬁnance loans by the
banks, and then take their earnings in states where consumers and owners
have a high marginal utility of consumption. By doing this, they allow con-
sumers and owners to reduce the variation in their consumption across
states.
Welfare
The ﬁrst theorem of welfare economics tells us that, under very weak
assumptions about nonsatiation, every equilibrium of an Arrow-Debreu
economy has a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation of goods and services. So in the
equilibrium sketched previously, it is impossible to make some economic
agents better oﬀ without making others worse oﬀ. In particular, risk shar-
ing is eﬃcient and there is no scope for government intervention or regu-
lation to increase eﬃciency.
Absence of Bank Runs, Bankruptcy, and Systemic Risk
One important thing to note about the case of complete markets and
contracts is that there is no bankruptcy for banks or insurance companies.
Since it is possible to trade contingent securities for every state and con-
tract payments can be varied in every state, assets and liabilities can always
be matched so bank runs and bankruptcy do not occur. Since bank runs
and bankruptcy do not occur there is no systemic risk with complete mar-
kets. As we will see, when markets and contracts are incomplete this is no
longer the case, and this has important implications for the characteristics
of equilibrium.
7.3.3 The Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Risk Sharing
In an Arrow-Debreu world, risk sharing is mediated by markets. In par-
ticular, the capital is provided to the market and not to any speciﬁc indi-
vidual ﬁnancial institution. Similarly, there are no over-the-counter (OTC)
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trade contingent securities with “the market.” One could introduce speciﬁc
capital contracts between investors and banks or insurers, but these would
be redundant securities. In fact, we can establish a Modigliani-Miller the-
orem for banks and insurers along the lines of Gale (2004). For example,
suppose that a bank wants to raise an amount of capital e0. It will oﬀer in-
vestors a contract (e0, e1, e2) under which it promises to pay investors et(s)
in state s at date t in exchange for the contribution of e0 at date 0. In order
to be acceptable to the investors, the capital contract (e0, e1, e2) will have to
satisfy the participation constraint
E[  e0   e1(s)   e2(s)]   0.
The bank’s objective function remains the same as before, but now the
value of the capital contract is added to its budget constraint. Clearly, the
bank will want to minimize the cost of the contract in order to maximize
the market value of the bank. Thus, an optimal contract will minimize
E[ e0   q1(s)e1(s)   q2(s)e2(s)],
subject to the participation constraint above. This problem is the dual of
the investor’s decision problem in the preceding section. Because of the lin-
earity of the problem, in equilibrium the market value of the contract is
zero and the participation constraint is binding. In other words, the capi-
tal contract will have no eﬀect on the bank’s budget constraint and no
eﬀect on its objective function. Furthermore, the introduction of an ex-
plicit capital structure has no eﬀect on the endogenous variables we care
about (the allocation of consumption and investment in assets) because the
trades implied by the contract are oﬀset in the contingent security markets.
In an exactly similar way, we can show that any insurance contract be-
tween banks and insurance companies would be redundant. This does not
mean that risk is not being shared between the insurance and banking sec-
tors. To the extent that there is any scope for sharing risk between the two
sectors (credit risk transfer), it is exploited fully and eﬃciently, using the
markets for contingent securities.
7.3.4 Derivatives and Contracts
In practice, we do not observe markets for contingent securities as such.
Instead, we observe markets for spot trading of assets, a variety of deriva-
tive securities whose purpose is to allow hedging of risk from the under-
lying securities, and a variety of risk-sharing contracts such as insurance
contracts. Regardless of the form that risk sharing takes, similarly to Ross
(1976), if there are enough derivatives and contracts, markets will eﬀec-
tively be complete and the allocation of risk will be the same as in the
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. This is the sense in which credit risk transfer is
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tively complete, then they ensure a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation of resources
is achieved. This is the ﬁrst main result of the paper—that credit risk trans-
fer is desirable when markets and contracts are eﬀectively complete.
This argument assumes there is no capital regulation and indeed this is
optimal. What happens if there is capital regulation? Suppose next we get
rid of all contingent securities so markets are no longer complete but allow
a spot market for assets at date 1 (equivalent to a forward market for con-
sumption at date 2). If we still allow banks and insurers to write complete
contracts, then markets are eﬀectively complete, because there are only two
representative agents (plus the risk-neutral investors who receive no sur-
plus). However, in this case, the net eﬀect of risk sharing between investors
and the banks or insurance companies must be mediated by an explicit
contract, and it is this contract that is controlled by capital-adequacy reg-
ulation. If the bank is required to increase e0, this will have a real impact on
its feasible set and on the value of its objective function. It cannot be oﬀset
by side trades, because we assume that all trades are governed by pairwise
contracts, and those between the investors and banks are explicitly regu-
lated. Markets are no longer eﬀectively complete and the properties of
equilibrium change signiﬁcantly.
We next develop a simple numerical example to show that, when markets
and contracts are incomplete, there can be an increase in systemic risk as a
result of capital regulation that forces banks to hold too much capital.
7.4 Increased Systemic Risk from Capital Regulation
In this section we present simple numerical examples to illustrate our
second result—that capital regulation can increase systemic risk when
markets and contracts are incomplete. In contrast to the previous section,
we assume there are no state-contingent securities. Whereas with complete
markets it was possible to trade securities that paid oﬀ 1 unit of the con-
sumption good in aggregate states HH, LH, HL, and LL at dates t   1, 2,
now this is not the case. There are only markets for the long and short as-
sets. Contracts are also incomplete. Whereas before payoﬀs could be made
explicitly contingent on states HH, LH, HL, and LL, this is no longer pos-
sible.
We start by considering the banking sector on its own and then go on to
consider the insurance sector in isolation. Without capital regulation we
show that in the example there is no incentive to have credit risk transfer
between the two sectors. However, with capital regulation where capital
can be reduced when there is credit risk transfer between the sectors, we
show that the transfer will take place. Moreover, this credit risk transfer
can increase systemic risk in the banking sector.
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No Capital
To start with we consider what happens if there is no capital available for
banks from investors.
Example 1. The return on the long asset is R   1.4.
For depositors in the banks   0.5; and U(c)   Ln(c). In state  H for
banks, which occurs with probability 0.7, the loans pay oﬀ BH   1.7 with
probability  H   1. The probability of state  L is 0.3 and in this state the
loans pay oﬀ BL   0.9 with probability 1 –  L   1.
Banks’ investment in the short asset is denoted x, their investment in the
long asset is denoted y, and their loans to ﬁrms are denoted z. They receive
an endowment of 1 from depositors, so x   y   z   1.
The contract the banks use with their depositors are incomplete in the
following sense. The banks cannot make the payment at date 1 contingent
on the aggregate state. The aggregate state at date 1 is now observable but
not veriﬁable, and hence contracts cannot be made contingent on it. In-
stead, the deposit contract banks use promises a ﬁxed amount c1to any de-
positor wishing to withdraw. Since the banking industry is competitive,
then as before each bank’s objective is to maximize the expected utility of
its depositors. If a bank did not do this then another bank would enter,
oﬀer a better contract, and take away all its customers. The implication of
this is that the banks will pay out all their remaining funds to late con-
sumers at date 2. The amount the late consumers will receive will depend
on whether ﬁrms’ loans are repaid in full. Hence there are two possible pay-
outs, c2H in state  H, and c2L in state  L.
Banks are unable to distinguish between early and late consumers. If late
consumers deduce that they will be better oﬀwithdrawing at date 1 then all
depositors will attempt to withdraw. If a bank is unable to meet the de-
mands of its depositors then it goes bankrupt, its assets are liquidated, and
the proceeds are distributed to the depositors in proportion to their de-
posits. When markets and contracts were complete, assets and liabilities
could be balanced state by state and bankruptcy never occurred. Now,
however, bankruptcy may occur if late consumers have an incentive to pre-
tend to be early consumers, so there is a run on the bank.
At date 0, the banks choose their portfolio, x, y, and z, and the deposit
contract c1, c2H, and c2L, to maximize the expected utility of the deposi-
tors. In equilibrium, x, y, and z must be nonnegative. We will suppose ini-
tially that there are no runs and check to see that this assumption is sat-
isﬁed. Since in this case there is no uncertainty about the banks’ needs for
liquidity at date 1, they will use the short-term asset to provide consump-
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and z to
Max 0.5U(c1)   0.5[0.7U(c2H)   0.3U(c2L)]
subject to x   y   z   1,
c1   ,
c2H   ,
c2L   .
The ﬁrst constraint is the budget constraint at date 0. The second con-
straint gives the per capita consumption of the early consumers. Since
there is 1 depositor and 0.5 of these are early consumers and 0.5 are late
consumers, we need to divide the total consumption produced by the in-
vestment in the short asset at date 1 by 0.5 to get the per capita consump-
tion. The third and fourth constraints give the per capita consumption of
the late consumers in states  Hand  Lrespectively. Clearly, c2H c2L. In or-
der for a run to be avoided, we also need c2L c1; otherwise, late consumers
will pretend to be early consumers and will withdraw their money at date1.
Denoting the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint  , the ﬁrst order
conditions are:
   0,
       0,
       0.
The solution for the equilibrium is
x   0.5; y   0.22; z   0.28
c1   1; c2H   1.568; c2L   1.12
EU   0.1744
It can be seen directly that c2L   c1, so in state  L late consumers will not
have an incentive to withdraw their money and cause a run. As a result
there will be no systemic risk in the banking industry.
0.15BL   
yR   zBL
0.35BH   
yR   zBH
0.15R
  
yR   zBL
0.35R
  




yR   zBL   
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Next consider what happens if there are investors who can make capital
available to the banks.
For the investors providing equity capital, the opportunity cost is   1.5.
Since the investors are indiﬀerent between consumption at date 1 and
date 2, it is optimal to set e1   0 and not invest any of the capital e0 that is
contributed at date 0 in the short asset. In state  H, when depositors’ mar-
ginal utility of consumption is the lowest, it is possible to make a payout e2
to investors. The banks’ optimization problem is the same as before except
now the date 0 budget constraint is
x   y   z   e0   1.
and
c2H   .




c2H   .
The ﬁrst-order conditions for x, y, z, and e0 are now
   0,
       0,
       0,
       0.
The solution for the equilibrium in this case is
x   0.5; y   0; z   0.726; e0   0.226
c1   1; c2H   1.5; c2L   1.306
EU   0.1820
0.35 /0.7
   
yR   zBH   e0 /0.7
0.15BL   
yR   zBL
0.35BH    
yR   zBH   e0 /0.7
0.15R
  
yR   zBL
0.35R
   




yR   zBH   e0 /0.7
   
0.5
yR   zBH   e2   
0.5
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c2L   c1.
Comparing the case without capital to the case with, it can be seen that
expected utility is increased from 0.174 to 0.182. Capital allows the depos-
itors to share risk with the investors. This improves welfare directly but it
also allows the bank to invest more in loans and less in the long asset, which
has a lower expected return (1.40) than the loans (1.46). This increases ex-
pected consumption for the late consumers from 0.7   1.568   0.3   1.12
  1.434 to 0.7   1.5   0.3   1.306   1.442. In addition to this increase in
expected consumption there is also clearly a reduction in the variability of
consumption (1.568 and 1.12 before versus 1.5 and 1.306 now), because the
repayment to investors occurs only in the good state. Risk is not eliminated
from the depositors’ consumption even though the investors providing the
capital are risk neutral because capital is costly. The investors’ opportunity
cost of capital is   1.5 while the expected return on the loans is only 1.46
and on the long asset 1.4. It is only the increase in expected utility from
smoothing consumption that makes it worthwhile using investors’ capital,
and only up to the point where the marginal beneﬁt is equal to the marginal
cost. This is why depositors continue to bear risk.
This is not the only kind of situation that can occur. In some cases the
bank will not want to use capital at all. To see this consider the following
example.
Example 2. This is exactly the same as Example 1 except that R   1.28, BH
  1.6, and BL   0.8, so EB   1.36.
It can be shown that the equilibrium—whether capital is available or
not—is the same.
x   0.5; y   0.333; z  0.314; e0   0
c1   0.990; c2H   1.494; c2L   0.990
EU   0.1341
There is no role for capital at all in this example. Any capital regulation that
imposes a positive minimum requirement will lead to ineﬃciency.
We will use Example 2 when we consider the banking and insurance sec-
tors together.
7.4.2 The Insurance Sector
We next turn to the insurance sector and consider it on its own. As ex-
plained earlier there are ﬁrms that own assets that produce Aat t 2 if they
are undamaged. For our example, we assume that A   1.3. The owners of
these ﬁrms consume at date 2 and have U   Ln(c).
With some probability  (s) a ﬁrm’s asset is damaged at date t 1. It costs
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repair the asset produces nothing. Insurance companies insure the ﬁrms
and allow the risk to be pooled. As before, the ﬁrms that the insurance
companies insure are diﬀerent from the ﬁrms that the banks make loans to.
The parameters for Example 2 are used, so R   1.28.
State  H occurs with probability 0.9, and in this case  H   0.5 ﬁrms have
damaged machines. State  L occurs with probability 0.1 and  L   1 ﬁrms
have damaged machines.
Similarly to the banking sector, the insurance companies cannot access
complete markets with securities contingent on aggregate states. They can
only buy the long and short assets. They also cannot write state-contingent
contracts. They can promise to insure the ﬁrms’ machines irrespective of
state s. This means that an insurance company may go bankrupt. In this
case its assets are liquidated and distributed to the ﬁrms it was insuring.
The costs of an insurance company liquidating long-term assets at date
t   1 if it goes bankrupt is such that the proceeds are zero. Grace, Klein,
and Phillips (2003) have found that for a large sample of insurers that went
bankrupt from 1986–1999 the average cost of insolvent ﬁrms accessing
the guarantee funds was $1.10 per $1 of preinsolvency assets. By way of
contrast, James (1991) found that the ﬁgure for banks for the late 1980s
was $0.30.
Each ﬁrm has an endowment of 0.8 at date t   0 that it can use to buy
insurance or invest itself. As mentioned in the previous section, it will be
assumed that the ﬁrms just buy insurance from the insurance companies.
The ﬁrms can use the markets for the long and the short assets to smooth
consumption for their owners.
No Capital
The insurance industry is competitive, so the companies do not earn any
proﬁts—all funds are paid out to the ﬁrms they insure. At date 0 the in-
surance companies’ objective is to maximize the expected utility of the
ﬁrms’ owners. If they did not do this another insurance company would en-
ter and take their business away. The insurance companies can oﬀer partial
or full insurance to ﬁrms. If they oﬀer partial insurance they charge 0.5C
 0.4 at date t 0. Suppose the ﬁrms put the other 0.4 of their endowment
in the long-term asset (it will be shown that this is optimal shortly). In or-
der to have funds to allow ﬁrms’ damaged assets to be repaired, the insur-
ance companies must invest in the short asset so that they have liquidity at
date t 1. In state  H, the funds they need for claims to repair the damaged
assets are  HC   0.4. They have funds of 0.4 and can pay all the claims to
repair the damaged assets. The amount the owners of the ﬁrms obtain is
therefore A   0.4R   1.812. In state  L, the insurance companies receive
claims of  LC   0.8. They don’t have suﬃcient funds to pay these so they
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surance industry. When the insurance companies go bankrupt their assets
are distributed equally among the claimants. The ﬁrms receive 0.4 from the
insurance companies’ liquidation of its short term assets. The ﬁrms can’t
repair their assets so these produce nothing. In state  L, the amount the
owners of the ﬁrm receive is therefore 0.4   0.4R   0.912. Their expected
utility with partial insurance is
EUpartial   0.9U(A   0.4R)   0.1U(0.4   0.4R)   0.5258.
If the insurance company oﬀered full insurance they would charge 0.8 at
t   0 and could meet all of their claims in both states. At t   1 in state  H
they would have 0.4 left over. Since the industry is competitive, they would
pay this out to the insured ﬁrms. In this case
EUfull   0.9U(A   0.4)   0.1U(A)   0.5038.
This is worse than partial insurance.
If the ﬁrms decide not to have insurance then they would invest their en-
dowment in the long asset. Their expected utility would be
EUnone   0.9[0.5U(0.8R)   0.5U(A   0.8R)]   0.1U(0.8R)   0.3925.
Finally, if they decided to self-insure and hold their endowment in the
short asset so they could repair their machines when necessary they would
obtain
EUself   0.9[0.5U(A)   0.5U(A   0.8)]   0.1U(A)   0.4782.
Thus the optimal scheme is for the insurance industry to partially insure
ﬁrms and to charge 0.4 at t   0. The ﬁrms put the remaining part of their
endowment in the long asset.
The Role of Capital
In this case there is no role for capital in the insurance sector. Capital
providers charge a premium. Their funds would have to be invested in the
short asset. There are already potentially enough funds from customers to
do this, but it is simply not worth it. If there is a premium to be paid for the
capital it is even less worth it. Capital will not be used in the insurance in-
dustry if it is not regulated to do so.
7.4.3 Bringing Together the Banking and Insurance Sectors
Now consider what happens if we consider the two sectors together and
look at possible interactions. We start with the situation where there is no
regulation and then go on to consider what happens with regulation.
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Without any regulation both sectors have the same equilibrium as when
they are considered on their own. Given that markets and contracts are in-
complete, there are no incentives for the insurance sector to insure the
banking sector and have credit risk transfer. All the insurance sector could
do is to hold the long-term asset and pay oﬀ when the loans default. But
the banking sector can do this on its own. In fact, with insurance the sys-
temic risk means that there would be a strict loss in this case. The value of
the long-term assets held in the insurance companies would be lost.
There is also no gain for the banking sector to bear the risk of the insur-
ance sector. They would have to hold the short-term asset, but the insur-
ance sector can do this just as eﬃciently.
Of course, if markets and contracts were complete then there would be
an incentive to share risk. The consumption at date 2 of the bank deposi-
tors and insured ﬁrms’ owners are as follows.
State
HH LH HL LL
Bank depositors 1.494 1.494 0.990 0.990
Insured ﬁrm owners 1.812 0.912 1.812 0.912
By, for example, transferring consumption from the bank depositors to the
insured ﬁrms’ owners in state LHin the amount of 0.0386 and vice versa in
state HLin the amount of 0.01 it is possible to make both groups better oﬀ.
If the shocks to the two sectors are independent then the expected value of
this transfer is
0.07   0.0386   0.27   0.01   0.
The expected utility of the bank depositors is improved from 0.1341 to
0.1394 and the expected utility of the insured ﬁrms’ owners goes from
0.5258 to 0.5272. With complete markets and contracts optimal risk shar-
ing would ensure that the ratios of marginal utilities of consumption of the
bank depositors and the owners of the insured ﬁrms across states would be
equated. This is clearly far from being the case here. The incomplete mar-
kets and contracts that are actually in place in this section prevent im-
proved risk sharing of this type, and in fact there is no possibility of an im-
provement through credit risk transfer in the absence of capital regulation.
Equilibrium with Ineﬃcient Capital Regulation in the Banking Sector
Now suppose that the government requires banks to have a certain min-
imum amount of capital. There is no role for capital regulation in our
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below the optimal level. The more interesting case is when it is set at too
high a level.
Suppose in Example 2 that the government requires banks to have e0  
0.2 compared to the optimal level of 0. The solution to the banks’ problem
then becomes
e0   0.2; e1   0; e2   0.429;
x   0.494; y   0; z   0.706
c1   0.988; c2H   1.401; c2L   1.129
EU   0.1305
The capital improves risk sharing and allows more funds to be invested
in loans, both from the extra capital and from the lower-return long asset.
However, the high cost of capital means that this is ineﬃcient; welfare is re-
duced from the case with no regulation.
Ineﬃcient Capital Regulation in Banking and 
Credit Risk Transfer to the Insurance Sector
Next, consider what happens if we allow for the possibility of credit risk
transfer from the banking sector to the insurance sector. It is supposed that
the shocks to the two sectors are independent. The regulation is such that
the existence of hedging of credit risk allows a reduction in the capital re-
quirement. By purchasing an insurance contract with cost of G   0.02 at
date 0 and a payoﬀ of 0.02   R   0.026 at date 2 when loans do not pay oﬀ
it is possible for a bank to reduce its capital requirement to the optimal
level of 0. The idea here is that the regulation does not work eﬀectively,
since under Basel II banks can use their own risk models. They can there-
fore construct their risk models to make it look as if the hedging instrument
reduces risk the right amount so as to allow them to reduce capital to the
optimal level. Notice that in order for this insurance contract to be such
that the insurance companies break even, which is necessary because of
competition, they will also provide a payment of 0.026 when the loans do
pay oﬀ, if they are able to. The insurance companies use the initial payment
from the banks at date 0 to buy the long-term asset and then pay out the
proceeds when they are solvent. When they are not solvent the long-term
asset is wasted because of the ineﬃcient liquidation in the insurance sector.
The only point of the credit risk transfer is to arbitrage the ineﬃcient cap-
ital regulation in the banking sector. The key issue is whether the gain from
this ineﬃcient risk transfer outweighs the ineﬃciency of the capital regu-
lation. It can be shown that in the example it does. The bank chooses its
portfolio x, y, and z to maximize the depositors’ expected utility, taking 
G   0.02 and e0   0 as given.
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  0.3[0.9U(c2HL)   0.1U(c2LL)]}
subject to 1   e0   x   y   z   G.
c1   ,
c2HH   ,
c2LH   ,
c2HL   ,
c2LL   .
Solving this gives the following:
x   0.5; y   0.15; z   0.33; e0   0
c1   1; c2HH   1.491; c2LH   1.440; c2HL   0.963; c2LL   0.912
EU   0.1322
So the expected utility of the banks’ depositors is improved relative to
the case with no credit risk transfer (EU   0.1305) but, of course, they are
not as well oﬀ as in the case with no regulation (EU  0.1341), because the
credit risk transfer has costs associated with it. However, all this is beside
the point, because the solution assumes there will be no runs—but in fact
there will be runs in states HL and LL. In state HL, c2HL   0.963   c1   1,
and in state LL, c2LL   0.912   c1   1. In both cases the late consumers as
well as the early consumers will attempt to withdraw their funds. The banks
will anticipate this and will optimize taking this into account.
A key issue is what happens if there is a run on the bank in terms of the
liquidation value of the long asset and loans it holds. For simplicity, we as-
sume the bank can liquidate its assets for their full value. As mentioned
previously, James (1991) found that the cost of liquidating bank assets in
the late 1980s was $0.30 per dollar of assets, which is much lower than the
$1.10 per dollar cost of liquidating insurance assets that Grace, Klein, and
Phillips (2003) found. We could allow for some small loss of asset value and
all of these results would hold. The more ineﬃcient the banking regulation,
the greater this loss can be.
yR   zBL   
0.5
yR   zBL   GR
  
0.5
yR   zBH   e0 /0.7
   
0.5
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Systemic Risk and Regulation 365In the optimal solution, taking into account bankruptcy, the banks go
bankrupt in state LL and both the early and late consumers receive the
same amount
c1LL   c2LL   x   yR   zBL.
The full solution is
x   0.492; y   0.188; z   0.300; e0   0
In states HH, LH, and HL the banks avoid bankruptcy:
c1   0.984; c2HH   1.493; c2LH   1.441; c2HL   1.012
In state LL the banks go bankrupt:
c1LL   c2LL   0.973
EU   0.1318
We have thus shown the second result of the paper, namely that with in-
eﬃcient banking regulation credit risk transfer can increase overall sys-
temic risk. The insurance industry is hit by a large shock when it has high
claims from the ﬁrms it insures. At the same time, the banking industry has
low returns on its loans. Whereas without credit risk transfer the banks
avoided bankruptcy, this is not optimal any longer. They go bankrupt and
there is contagion from the insurance industry to the banking industry. The
credit risk transfer has created links between the industries and this allows
contagion.
7.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have developed a model of a ﬁnancial system with both
banking and insurance sectors. Banks and insurance companies do diﬀer-
ent things. Banks provide liquidity insurance to depositors, whereas insur-
ance companies pool risks. The ﬁrst result was to show that with complete
markets and contracts for aggregate risks intersectoral transfers are de-
sirable. They allow risk to be shared eﬃciently between the diﬀerent in-
dustries. The second result was to show that with incomplete markets and
contracts for aggregate risks credit risk transfer can occur as the result of
regulatory arbitrage and this can increase overall systemic risk.
The key question going forward, of course, is which view of credit risk
transfer is empirically relevant. As documented in section 7.2, the amount
of credit risk transfer between the two industries is currently relatively
small. Even if one were to take the view that this credit risk transfer is the re-
sult of regulatory arbitrage then the systemic risk may be slight. However,
going forward, transfers between sectors may increase, and if they are the
result of regulatory arbitrage, they may lead to an increase in systemic risk.
366 Franklin Allen and Douglas GalePerhaps more importantly, although the model can be interpreted liter-
ally as being about banking and insurance, it can also be viewed more gen-
erally. The other group of institutions that in recent years has been playing
an increasingly important role in the transfer of credit and the repackaging
of risk in general has been hedge funds (BIS 2005). If markets function 
well in the sense that risk-sharing opportunities are complete, then these
transfers of risk around the economy are desirable. However, if they are the
result of ineﬃcient regulation and regulatory arbitrage, they may not be.
Since hedge funds are unregulated while a large part of the ﬁnancial ser-
vices industry is regulated, much of this activity may well be the result of
regulatory arbitrage. More empirical work analyzing the nature of risk re-
allocation in the economy is required to understand the full consequences
on systemic risk.
In the model presented, systemic risk was not particularly damaging.
Assets could be liquidated in the banking system for the full amount of
their value. In practice, systemic risk can be extremely damaging. Aug-
menting the model to allow for endogenous liquidation values and spill-
overs to the real economy means that the kind of eﬀect modeled here with
incomplete markets may be quite damaging.
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Comment Charles W. Calomiris
The Allen-Gale paper is motivated in part by the observation that sub-
stantial credit risk has been transferred from bank portfolios to insurance
company portfolios in recent years through credit risk derivatives. The au-
thors ask whether this risk transfer reﬂects, in part, a form of regulatory
capital arbitrage, as risk migrates toward a more favorable (lenient) set of
risk-based regulatory capital requirements for insurance companies. Their
368 Franklin Allen and Douglas Galemodel shows that, under those circumstances, such a risk transfer can have
the undesirable eﬀect of making the ﬁnancial system as a whole more frag-
ile by reducing the amount of capital relative to risk for the ﬁnancial sys-
tem as a whole.
In a recent study, Minton, Stulz, and Williamson (2005) quantiﬁed the
use of credit risk derivatives and found that, as of 2003, only nineteen of
345 large U.S. bank holding companies in their sample actually use credit
derivatives, but the assets of these nineteen bank holding companies ac-
count for roughly two-thirds of total bank holding company assets. They
also ﬁnd that banks that are more likely to buy protection in the credit de-
rivatives market are also more likely to be asset securitizers, and that those
banks also tend to have low capital ratios. Those facts provide some evi-
dence that at least is consistent with the notion that regulatory capital ar-
bitrage could be a factor in bank decisions to use credit derivatives to hedge
loans.
But there are reasons to think that (a) regulatory capital arbitrage may
not be all bad, and (b) minimum regulatory capital requirements for in-
surance companies or banks may not be binding constraints on the
amount of capital that is allocated to absorb default risk. With respect to
the possible desirability of regulatory capital arbitrage, it is important to
remember that it is possible for regulatory requirements to be set too high
as well as too low. Suppose that, absent any regulatory limits, and based
solely on the preferences of market participants (including the stockhold-
ers and debtholders of banks and insurance companies), the equilibrium
capital ratios of banks would be lower than the minimum regulatory re-
quirements set by regulators. In that case, it is possible that regulatory cap-
ital arbitrage can be socially beneﬁcial, since it allows the ﬁnancial system
to make full use of scarce equity capital. That is particularly true if private
market discipline substitutes for regulatory discipline by ensuring that cap-
ital is maintained by arbitraging ﬁnancial institutions so that its quantity
varies positively with asset risk.
Calomiris and Mason (2004) make precisely these arguments about
credit card–securitizing banks. While they recognize that an important
part of the motivation for credit card securitization is regulatory capital
arbitrage, they conclude that credit card issuers choose equilibrium capital
ratios above the regulatory minimum that those institutions could have
chosen. They interpret that evidence as suggesting that market discipline 
is the binding constraint determining the capital requirements for card
issuers (relative to total, on– and oﬀ–balance sheet risk). Furthermore,
Calomiris and Mason (2004) argue that part of the reason that regulators,
ratings agencies, and market participants may permit arbitrage, as well as
some other questionable accounting practices that securitization entails, is
that they recognize that the one-size-ﬁts-all, “risk-based” capital standard
applied to banks probably results in a disproportionately large ratio of
Systemic Risk and Regulation 369bank capital relative to risk (compared to other banks) for credit card
banks that would keep credit card receivables entirely on their balance
sheets. Thus, in the case of credit card receivables, it may be that markets,
not regulators, are constraining capital-risk choices of banks, and that reg-
ulatory capital arbitrage makes ﬁnancial intermediation more eﬃcient by
avoiding the waste of idle equity capital.
With respect to credit risk derivatives, the analogous question is whether
insurance companies face market discipline that constrains their choices of
risk in ways that limit the systemic vulnerability that Allen and Gale posit.
Surely, policyholders in insurance companies, or guaranteed investment
contract (GIC) holders, wish to avoid loss, and to the extent that they are
not perfectly protected by governments, might react to unwarranted
choices of risk relative to capital by moving their business to other insur-
ance companies. Indeed, there is a substantial body of evidence suggesting
that market discipline can constrain the risk choices of ﬁnancial institu-
tions, including banks and insurance companies, so long as they are not
protected too much from market discipline by the government safety net
(Brewer, Mondschean, and Strahan 1992, Brewer and Mondschean 1993,
Calomiris and Powell 2001, Calomiris and Mason 2003, Calomiris and Wil-
son 2004, Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2004).
Indeed, in historical banking systems that lacked both deposit insurance
and minimum capital ratio requirements (the former having been created
in the United States in 1934, the latter dating from the 1980s), bank capi-
tal ratios tended to be higher than for today’s banks. The same is true for
uninsured ﬁnancial institutions today. For example, ﬁnance companies,
which rely primarily on very short-term commercial paper for their fund-
ing, maintain capital ratios that vary positively with their asset risk
(Calomiris and Mason 1998). Calomiris and Mason also show that, as of
1996, book equity capital relative to assets diﬀered substantially across
types of ﬁnancial intermediaries, and that, on average, categories of inter-
mediaries with higher asset risk (measured by the standard deviation of as-
set returns, inferred from equity returns and leverage ratios) maintained
higher book equity capital, as shown in table 7C.1.
Thus, from the perspective of the literature on the market discipline of
ﬁnancial institutions, regulatory capital arbitrage, per se, may not pose a
signiﬁcant systemic risk; rather, the greater threat to systemic risk likely
comes from the joint impositionof government protection and government
prudential regulation and supervision (including the setting and enforcing
of capital ratios) in ways that remove market incentives to limit bank risk
and maintain adequate capital. Part of that risk relates to the failure of reg-
ulators to properly set minimum risk-based capital requirements; part of
that systemic risk relates to the failure of supervisors to enforce regulatory
limits that have been set (e.g., by properly accounting for bank losses). In
short, it may be that regulatory arbitrage is mainly a problem in the ﬁnan-
370 Franklin Allen and Douglas Galecial system when government puts itself in charge of managing risk by re-
moving any private incentive to do so, and then fails to provide an adequate
regulatory substitute for private market discipline.
Of course, that is not the end of the story. There is no guarantee, even in
a well-functioning ﬁnancial system with private market discipline, that the
aggregate amount of capital chosen by ﬁnancial institutions will be the so-
cially optimal level. Liquidity crises, after all, probably entail signiﬁcant
economic externalities. The loss of bank capital in the aggregate can pre-
vent the ﬁnancial system from maintaining its proper role in providing new
credit to the nonﬁnancial sector, resulting in endogenous declines in asset
prices, bank loan quality, and macroeconomic activity, which feed on one
another. Externalities arise because the failure of one ﬁrm, sector, or inter-
mediary can have consequences for others. For example, in the fall of 1998,
Russia’s ﬁnancial collapse put pressure on global hedge funds to cut their
risks in order to maintain low default probabilities on their debts, in the
wake of losses from their Russian positions. Other emerging market secu-
rities that trade in international markets declined in price, putting pressure
on many other ﬁnancial institutions and issuers that had no direct connec-
tion to Russia’s problems.
It would be desirable to construct a realistic model that would capture
such eﬀects and help us to gauge whether macroeconomic externalities are
large enough to motivate minimum capital requirements in excess of the
privately chosen optimum. Such a model should consider how private mar-
ket discipline works (that is, solve for the privately determined risk-based
capital ratios of intermediaries in the absence of regulation), and should
model the causal links from an initial loss of capital to a subsequent con-
traction of credit supply by banks seeking to meet private market disci-
pline, which would entail further declines in ﬁrms’ asset values, leading in
turn to further loan losses for banks and further market discipline (see, for
example, Von Peter 2004). And such a model should also recognize the so-
cial costs of raising capital requirements (since equity capital is costly to
raise, and a scarcity of equity capital can limit the supply of credit).
Many models of banking, including the one in this chapter, are not likely
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Table 7C.1 Equity ratios and asset risks for various ﬁnancial intermediaries
N BE/A Sigma of assets
Bank holding companies 378 0.09138 0.25553
Investment banks 55 0.29358 0.91031
Life insurance companies 51 0.12796 0.27275
Property and casualty 108 0.28110 0.52845
Finance companies 95 0.25442 0.96147
Source: Calomiris and Mason (1998).
Note: BE/A = book equity/assets.to get us very far toward addressing the question of whether, and by how
much, externalities motivate higher capital requirements. Allen and Gale’s
model conceives of banks as a consumption inventory technology (i.e., fol-
lowing the Diamond and Dybvig 1983 model), not a risk-control/credit-
supply technology. We are not going to get very far down the road toward
modeling macroeconomic externalities and capital requirements for banks
without considering (1) how private market discipline would constrain
capital and risk choices in the absence of capital requirements, (2) how
costly it is to raise equity capital, (3) how those costs of raising capital vary
over the business cycle, or (4) how to model dynamic linkages among bank
credit, asset prices, loan quality, and bank capital ratios.
If it could be shown that macroeconomic externalities motivate an in-
crease in minimum capital requirements, the next step would be to ask how
those capital requirements (in excess of what is demanded by the market)
might be credibly enforced. Experience has taught that one cannot simply
take for granted that such requirements will be enforced, since the rule
throughout the world has been that enforcement is lax when it is most
needed. Much recent work has argued that market signals could be har-
nessed by regulators to improve the credible enforcement of capital re-
quirements, and this seems to be a promising approach, especially for con-
straining supervisory and regulatory forbearance (see, for example,
Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee 2000, Calomiris and Powell
2001). The current regulatory approach favored by the Group of Seven
(G7), however, is quite diﬀerent, relying on complex formulas constructed
by regulators, and internal bank risk modeling subject to regulatory
scrutiny. That approach may work, but it has not been tested yet and I am
very skeptical. The biggest problem of capital standards enforcement is the
tendency of supervisors and regulators to relax standards when times get
rough. Complex formulas and internal modeling oversight unfortunately
are ideally suited to granting regulators the discretion they need to decide
not to do their jobs when that becomes politically expedient.
As part of the discussion of capital requirements, it is also important for
economists and regulators to recognize the prevalence and the shortcom-
ings of ex post policies that are often used to deal with ﬁnancial collapses,
which often result from maintaining inadequate bank capital. Those in-
clude various kinds of loss-sharing arrangements between banks and tax-
payers (including bank bailouts, debt forgiveness, forbearance of regula-
tory enforcement, and taxpayer-subsidized preferred stock injections into
banks in reaction to loan losses). The lessons of recent experience strongly
suggest that such ex post policy responses are extremely costly and often
result from inadequate ex ante incentives to manage risk properly (for a
review, see Calomiris, Laeven, and Klingebiel 2005). The recognition that
generous safety net protections encourage excessive risk taking, and that
this often results in extremely socially costly ex post interventions into the
372 Franklin Allen and Douglas Galeﬁnancial sector, oﬀers a reason to set capital requirements higher ex ante
than they would need to be in a truly laissez faire world.
The twin goals of (a) determining the right level of risk-based capital for
the economy, and (b) ﬁnding a way to enforce capital standards if the
amounts of capital chosen by private market discipline are inadequate, re-
main elusive, especially in the presence of generous government safety
nets. The hardest challenge for ﬁnancial economists is to devise models of
the linkages among ﬁnancial system credit, ﬁnancial intermediaries’ capi-
tal, ﬁnancial intermediaries’ risks, nonﬁnancial ﬁrms’ asset prices, and
macroeconomic activity that would be realistic enough to help us gauge the
optimal risk-based capital ratio for the economy. The hardest challenge for
policymakers is to ﬁnd a way to enforce such policies credibly, while re-
maining ﬂexible enough to permit activities with relatively low fundamen-
tal risks to avoid being penalized by the capital budgeting mandates of one-
size-ﬁts-all rules.
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Discussion Summary
Gary Gorton began the general discussion by questioning whether the
amount of risk transferred from banks to insurance companies is as large
as some statistics imply. Although credit derivative contracts may transfer
risk, many securitizations receive implicit support from sponsors. He also
questioned whether capital requirements can be binding in the long run,
because banking business can move to nonbank ﬁnancial institutions.
Martin Feldstein observed that economic capital considerations drive
large-bank decision making, not regulatory capital requirements.
Anthony Saunders noted that the behavior of insurance companies (and
other nonbank institutions) in bad states of the world is important to un-
derstanding systemic risk. Defaults by nonbanks, in addition to disrupting
nonbank markets, could aﬀect bank solvency. Peter Garbernoted that U.S.
insurance companies are subject to capital regulations, which are compli-
cated, and that in bad states of the world insurance companies may gam-
ble for redemption just like banks. Martin Feldsteinobserved that the guar-
antee funds that protect U.S. policyholders may strengthen moral hazard
incentives of weak insurers. Surviving insurance companies must make up
the losses imposed by those that fail.
When discussion turned to the experience of European insurance com-
panies, Paul Kupiec noted that their losses in recent years were mainly
driven by losses on their equity investments, which are much larger as a
proportion of assets than at U.S. insurance companies. Philipp Hartmann
agreed that equity losses were the ﬁrst and primary source of loss, but
noted that losses on credit derivatives were a material second leg of the
double whammy they suﬀered.
Hayne Leland argued that credit derivatives might cause systemic prob-
lems for reasons other than those mentioned in Allen and Gale’s paper. If
dynamic hedging is used by protection sellers to hedge their credit deriva-
tive portfolios, increases in default rates may have knock-on eﬀects in eq-
uity and bond markets, amplifying the price declines that are in any case
likely to be associated with increased credit risk. Peter Garber agreed that
such dynamic hedging is common in practice.
374 Franklin Allen and Douglas GaleIn the course of the discussion, several participants mentioned the com-
mon wisdom that (a) many risk-transfer transactions by banks (securitiza-
tions, credit derivatives, and others) are “capital arbitrage” (intended pri-
marily to reduce regulatory capital requirements), and (b) losses suﬀered
by insurance companies on their investments in credit derivative contracts
were due to insurance companies’ lack of expertise in pricing credit risk.
Richard Cantor noted that, at least in the United States, it is not clear that
credit protection sellers lost money on the whole in the long run. Although
their portfolios may have suﬀered mark-to-market losses during 2001–
2003, when credit spreads were high, over the longer term the premiums
they earn may more than compensate for payouts. Ken Abbott commented
that concerns about the precision of credit risk pricing should be more gen-
eral. He does not have great conﬁdence in the credit risk pricing models he
has seen used in practice. Most of the risk-transfer transactions he has seen
have economic motivations and are not capital arbitrage. David Modest
observed that at the time of the conference, the cyclical pendulum ap-
peared to have swung to an excess of supply by protection sellers, forcing
spreads down to unreasonable levels.
Commenting on some of the assumptions of the Allen and Gale model,
Casper de Vries wondered if results would be diﬀerent if capital regulation
was useful rather than having no role in enhancing welfare. The assump-
tion that regulation is binding in equilibrium may not be necessary for it to
aﬀect the equilibrium, as it might aﬀect the value of oﬀ-equilibrium-path
alternatives even if not binding.
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